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¶1 MR. LEV:  Thanks, Everyone, for being here today. 
¶2 Just so you know, this symposium will be published.  We have a court reporter, so 
the transcript of all the panels and the keynote speaker will be published, in addition to a 
number of what we think are very fascinating papers by our panelists.  And that will 
come out this summer, so look for that. 
¶3 Our first panel is exploring the issue of technology drivers of the BRIC economies.  
And we have first, on my left, David Orozco.  David is a 2004 graduate of Northwestern 
Law School.  He's currently a fellow at the Kellogg School of Management, and he 
recently -- can I say that?  He recently accepted an appointment at the Business School at 
Michigan Technology University.  His area of interest is intellectual property and kind of 
the big picture of how intellectual property interacts with policy. 
¶4 Next to him we have Linda Yueh.  Linda is with us today from London where she 
is on the faculty at the London School of Economics and Oxford University Department 
of Economics.  Linda is a specialist in international trade economics, and intellectual 
property economics.  She has written a paper for our forthcoming symposium issue, so 
we hope you'll all enjoy that.  It is in the first -- at least the first draft of it is in the CLE 
materials right now. 
¶5 And then next to Professor Yueh we have Vipin Gupta.  Professor Gupta received 
his Ph.D. at the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.  He's 
currently on the faculty at the School of Management of Simmons College in Boston. 
Professor Gupta is interested in the cultural aspects of intellectual property, particularly 
with respect to gender issues, disparity and inequality, and interested in how clustering of 
certain regions affects -- and the cultures of different regions affects the views toward 
intellectual property and technology. 
¶6 And with that I will leave it to Professor Yueh who is going to take the lead on this 
panel.  Thank you very much. 
¶7 (Applause.) 
¶8 MS. YUEH:  First of all, we were told by the Dean that we have to shout in this 
room to be heard. So, if there is any problems in hearing us, please just discreetly waive 
your arm and we'll speak up. 
¶9 The first thing I want to say is thank you very much to the organizers, to Dan Lev 
and to Jodie Rosello, for the invitation and putting together this very interesting 
symposium and conference.  I know that I'll be looking forward to reading the 
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symposium issue.  And also to thank the Dean very much for coming here today and 
welcoming us to this fantastic venue.  So despite what I said about shouting it is an 
absolutely lovely room, and I think aesthetics meanings everybody.  So I hope you enjoy 
the day as well. 
¶10 What we're going to do in this panel is we're going to try to set a good example in 
terms of time management, so each of the speakers will be given 20 minutes, and I will 
be fiercely waiving my "Five Minutes" sign in front of their faces if they're running over 
this time.  So this way there will be a good half hour for discussion left, because we very 
much would welcome participation from the audience, and any questions and discussions 
that you might have I think would be a valuable contribution to the symposium volume as 
well. 
¶11 So the order of speaking.  We had originally decided that David was going to go 
first, until we worked out that we are not very competent in terms of IT.  So since my 
presentation is up first, I will go first.  And then it will be followed by David, who will be 
speaking on industrial policies in BRIC countries, so looking across also a spectrum of 
countries in thinking about patents and who holds them.  And then Vipin will close us off 
with looking specifically at India to try to give you a picture of intellectual property 
rights in a particular major BRIC economy. 
¶12 So my presentation, and I'm going to make myself stick to the 20 minutes as well, 
is going to be essentially a look at TRIPS, which is the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights.  So my presentation is a story of global intellectual property 
rights, its relationship to economic growth, and specifically the implications for the BRIC 
economies, Brazil, Russia, India and China.  And I'm going to focus on the largest of the 
BRICs, which is China, for the illustration of my presentation.  So I will go ahead and 
start. 
¶13 So the motivation, I think, for looking at TRIPS or global intellectual property 
rights has really come about since we've had a rule-based regime, really starting in the 
last ten years.  So, yes, the WTO was preceded by GATT, but in terms of intellectual 
property the picture had changed as of about ten years ago when there was this global 
regime in place.  So the question I wanted to think about was how does an international 
rules-based system affect economic growth.  Because we think a lot about how domestic 
legal systems could impact innovation or intellectual property, but what are the 
implications for having a global system and what are the aspects of the global system that 
are most relevant.  So that was the picture, that was the question I had in mind when I 
began this exploration. 
¶14 So I focused specifically on the TRIPS provision, which of course came into effect 
with the WTO in the Marrakech articles, so it's an addendum to the main WTO articles, 
which really changed the picture of global intellectual property rights. And, indeed, I 
looked at a specific facet of what I  think TRIPS could do, which is to affect technology 
transfers that are critical to the growth story for developing countries.  That was the 
second motivation.  Then I looked at what that meant for a specific major emerging 
market, which is China. 
¶15 Now, I often discuss China as an emerging market, and one of my students the 
other day said, "Isn't China a major economy?  Why is it that we consider it an emerging 
market?"  Okay, okay, it is true in terms of aggregate GDP, national income, it is the 
fourth richest country in the world.  And yes, when you adjust for purchasing power 
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parity, so in other words not looking at its own exchange rate but adjusting for purchasing 
power, it is already the world's second largest economy.  But on a per capita basis China 
is still one of the poor developing countries in the world. That's why it is still considered 
an emerging market.  So, anyway, that's why China should still be in the BRIC.  It is not 
just B-R-I, or whatever the acronym might turn out to be. 
¶16 So the outline of my quick presentation is going to be TRIPS and economic growth.  
I'm just going to outline a bit about what the relevant provisions are in the TRIPS article.  
I'm going to then turn to evidence of growth and inequality, so looking at the 
convergence theory for economic growth, and then I'm going to look at BRIC. 
¶17 The way that TRIPS is often seen is that it harmonizes intellectual property law.  
So what TRIPS did was that it actually overturned the Paris and Berne Conventions, 
which were based on two major principles.  The first one is independence and the second 
one is territoriality.  What that essentially said was that intellectual property laws were 
specific and governed by a domestic country and other countries had to respect what IPR 
laws are in a particular country, so there is no harmonization. So China could have a 
particular intellectual property regime and the United States could have one and that 
would be consistent with international law. 
¶18 What TRIPS did is that it changed it. It actually harmonized the system.  So that 
means, of course, it's a uniform system of intellectual property rights.  So TRIPS actually 
covers all intellectual property rights from patents to copyrights to trademarks, and of 
course, similar to all WTO agreements, it also provides for national treatment, most 
favored nation status, and dispute settlement by the DSU. 
¶19 And, indeed, even though the TRIPS provision in particular hasn't actually been 
extended to developing countries, most of the LDCs are currently exempt, it already 
accounts for about 8 percent for all the cases brought before the DSU. 
¶20 Now, WTO -- in terms of why this is an important international rules-based regime 
to be concerned about, the WTO covers over 95 percent of world trade, about 150 
countries at the last count, and what it does in terms of thinking about the implications for 
LDCs is that it creates -- extending this kind of intellectual property rights protection 
gives the kind of artificial monopoly that we're familiar with in developed countries' IPR 
systems which is supposed to give an incentive to innovate to the innovator by reducing 
the risk of expropriation.  So how that is done, of course, is that it gives an artificial 
monopoly extended to 15, or perhaps 20 years in Europe, to the innovator so that they 
undertake the risky investment needed to come about with R&D -- to invest in R&D and 
to produce innovation. 
¶21 Now, international economic law, of course, will do two things in this respect very 
similar to what a domestic system is but with notable differences.  The first one is that if 
you create an artificial monopoly on intellectual property rights, then technology 
transfers, which lots of developing countries receive because they are far from the 
technology frontier, they are still in the imitation stage of development, especially we're 
talking primarily industrial technologies that could make the factories more productive, it 
creates a monopoly price for the technology transfer, making that process of imitation 
more costly. 
¶22 On the other hand it could have the same effect of stimulating innovation, so this 
could induce multinationals to provide more sophisticated technologies, it could provide 
an incentive for domestic firms to better innovate if there previously wasn't a very good 
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IPR system.  And of course a dispute resolution mechanism in general provides better 
disputes over, say, enforcement of IPRs, which is a major issue in the BRIC economies 
and other emerging markets, and I think you'll cover that in a later panel. 
¶23 So there are these two counter-weighing effects.  On the one hand, yes, it could 
make technology transfers more expensive; on the other hand, it may actually induce 
more innovation.  Very similar but with a notable difference in terms of convergence 
theory in the global economy. 
¶24 So the second thing to think about in terms of TRIPS and economic growth is that 
technology transfer has actually never been free. So when you think about economic 
growth models, and there is always a prediction of convergency because there is always, 
say, a country, a developed country with more sophisticated technology, developed IPR 
system, they're closer to the technology frontier. And then there is the developing 
countries who can still imitate, farther from the frontier, they're poor, they don't spend as 
much on R&D, but really they're just not technologically sophisticated to have to warrant 
R&D spending in order to grow. 
¶25 So what these models suggest and what they predict is that in a normal sort of 
growth framework, say a solo model or neoclassical growth model, there are what are 
known as diminishing returns to a factor.  So the more capital stock you add you gain a 
less -- a falling amount of output for every unit.  So that makes sense; you can't 
perpetually add computers without increasing the other factor, which is labor, without 
experiencing diminishing returns. 
¶26 Now, if there are diminishing returns then the solo model predicts that capital, 
which is the investment that would invest in sort of computers or other types of capital 
stock, would actually move from high-level countries where you have diminishing 
returns to developing countries where there are lower level of capital and therefore less 
likely to encounter diminishing returns.  This free movement in capital, of course 
embodied in technology because whatever is being invested in to be brought to a 
developing country is coming from a developed country, and that process of capital 
moving with free transfers of technology, because it's embodied in the capital, generates 
the prediction that global growth rates should actually converge.  Because if everybody 
has the same technology and capital is moving freely, then you should find there 
shouldn't be this vast disparity among developing and developed countries in terms of 
growth rates because everything should equalize in perfectly working markets. 
¶27 Now, this of course is empirically not true, and in a domestic, in a national system 
there are already models like endogenous growth theory which are trying to better 
explain the process of how it is that technology is accumulated, how it is that investment 
and foreign direct investment are actually realized. 
¶28 So what this means is that if technology wasn't free in the first place we would not 
have expected the predictions of the solo model, along with all the other factors that 
would predict divergence in global growth rate.  I'm going to show you evidence that 
there is indeed divergence in global growth rates. 
¶29 But this kind of IPR system would actually accentuate the process.  So before if 
technology wasn't free you wouldn't expect convergence, but now you've actually made 
technology transfers priced at monopoly rates which would make it harder and more 
expensive to catch up.  So developing countries weren't catching up in the first place, but 
this system has the potential of actually increasing the cost of development even further. 
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¶30 So the next slide that I'm showing you is growth rate and initial per capita GDP 
from 1960 to 1995.  On the X axis, which is the horizontal, that is per capital GDP in 
1960, and on the Y axis this is the growth rate from 1960 to 1995, which is the year of the 
adoption of the TRIPS agreement.  So this captures a good 35 years of global growth 
rates. 
¶31 Now, if there was a relationship between, say, low levels of per capita GDP and the 
growth rate what you should find is the poorest countries, so those closer to the origin, 
should have higher growth rates because growth is driven by technology and investment 
and the mechanisms that we talked about.  So it should be an inverse relationship, it 
should be a downward sloping line. However, as you can see from this graph, which I 
have plotted, I'm afraid, nearly 200 countries, there is no such relationship.  That simply 
even before the TRIPS agreement there was a big divergence in terms of global growth 
rates. 
¶32 What about the second factor that I talked about, that maybe it's simply outweighed 
by the fact that there is now more investment going in to, say, developing countries and 
embody better technology.  That is very much an empirical question, but I'm just going to 
show you a couple of bits of data looking at four direct investment flows. 
¶33 The first thing that you should notice is that from 1991 to 2004 world global -- 
global foreign direct investment flows are very high. Developing countries actually have 
a very small share of that, but it is actually quickly growing. It is quickly growing, 
however, for some regions of the world. 
¶34 So for Asia and the red line is Latin America, most FDI flows to those regions as 
opposed to, say, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe.  So there are changing 
investment flows, perhaps as a result of an increasing rules-based system.  Of course, 
there are other factors.  But it is also clear that most of the FDI goes to the successful 
economies. 
¶35 So this just give you a picture, a more recent picture, 2004, which sees developing 
countries catching up. 
¶36 But I should say on this picture that developing countries, a lot of this is going 
towards China, India, Brazil and Russia, the BRIC economies, the major emerging 
markets.  So it is not that all developing countries are experiencing this flow of capital, 
which embodies, of course, technology. 
¶37 Now, I'm going to move to sort of does it matter, FDI, intellectual property rights.  
I mean, does this actually matter in terms of innovation for emerging markets or major 
developing countries.  I'm going to look at China in particular, but I've given you some 
citations and references which say, you know, we're not sure. Most of the economic 
literature goes, "On the one hand, on the other hand."  So, yes, there are studies which 
show that patents, which typically are used as the best proxy for formal innovation, are 
linked to foreign direct investment, and of course research and development spending by 
the country itself.  And you hear this a lot in developed countries, how much do we spend 
on R&D, how much do we spend on R&D.  That's where it comes from.  But for 
developing countries foreign direct investment is important because of what I described 
earlier, but also because, hey, if you're a poor developing country you just don't have that 
much money to be spending on R&D.  I mean, you're in the imitation stage. 
¶38 So the literature says, okay, some countries there is a positive relationship between 
FDI and innovation measured by patents, other countries not so much. 
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¶39 Now, I'm focusing on China because in terms of FDI flows China is actually the 
leading destination for foreign direct investment in many years, in several years rivaling 
the United States. And in terms of stock it has the third largest stock in the world after 
only the U.S. and the U.K.  So in many ways if you don't find the positive relationship for 
China, it would be difficult to see how foreign direct investment might benefit other 
countries which simply don't get the kind of investment that goes to China. 
¶40 So looking at China -- first of all, just very quickly, I've just simply put up, they 
have patent laws, even before the WTO, and that's why you can look at patent data.  So 
you hear a lot about China has a poor IPR regime.  It is true, but they have a lot of de jure 
provisions; it's just that de facto the enforcement is poor. 
¶41 So China had a patent law since 1985, really at the start of urban reform, so it has 
been at least 25 years in terms of patent laws.  And, of course, China did adopt the TRIPS 
agreement so it's a continuation of the IPR regime, which had been strengthened up until 
the TRIPS agreement and then extended. 
¶42 And, of course, China does have a very aggressive foreign direct investment policy 
and industrial policy specifically aimed at getting technology in foreign direct 
investment, initially through mandating foreign direct investment to come in the form of 
joint ventures, which all the literature suggests that has more technology transfer 
potential.  And then in the mid 1990s by creating what are known as high technology 
development zones, a special form of special economics zone which are geared at 
attracting the technology embodied in foreign direct investment and then married to R&D 
facilities so that they can develop technologically to stimulate economic growth. 
¶43 So the first picture just shows the FDI in China, and it is sizable.  Obviously the big 
jump came in 1992 when China really bulked up its FDI policy by extending special 
economic zones beyond Fujian and Guangdong, and you see it shooting up. And like I 
said, China is now a leading destination. 
¶44 Now, in order to look at the effect of something like foreign direct development 
versus, say, other factors, like human capital or R&D spending, one has to account for the 
fact that the patent law regime is uniform across the country.  So I haven't put the figure 
up there, but the successful patent grant rate in China is pretty much the same across 
China's provinces.  But what these provinces differ at in terms of -- they differ is their 
level of development, the level of FDI, the amount of R&D spending that they incur, the 
level of education.  So national patent law regime but variations in terms of the number 
of patents in these provinces associated with different factors. 
¶45 So with variation one can explore what the relevant factors are rather than just 
looking at it without thinking about what the different regional affects might be. 
¶46 So I've put up all the provinces, GDP as well as patent, and this is your patent grant 
rate. So it is not that the regime is different for provinces, it is simply that there are other 
factors which explain the different numbers of patents granted in these provinces.  It's not 
just because some have better enforcement than others, it's pretty uniform. 
¶47 And what the determinant of innovation or patents show, and this is a fixed effect, 
negative binomial.  I'm happy to answer questions on regression theory.  Looking at 1991 
to 2001 when China really started its FDI intake, the significant factors affecting 
innovation are some of the things which you expect, R&D expenditure and FDI and other 
factors.  However, the most significant factors are definitely R&D and foreign direct 
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investment.  In fact, the marginal effect of spending an additional unit on R&D versus 
FDI is pretty similar.  So it matters for innovation. 
¶48 And I've simply broken this up by region, because as I said there are regional 
variations in terms of level of FDI, and of course level of development. 
¶49 And controlling for everything else, which I've shown on the slide in terms of -- 
including province-specific effects, it is R&D and FDI which matters on the coast, it is 
only FDI that matters in the central region, and in the interior it is human capital.  So 
there are high regional variations as well, it's not simply a picture -- it's not just the story 
of more FDI gives you more innovation, but it is found to be important controlling for all 
other preservable facts. 
¶50 So to conclude.  We don't -- it is too early to look at the evidence of TRIPS on 
income inequality because it hasn't taken effect for most developing countries.  However, 
it is likely to increase income inequality and convergence simply because it makes 
imitation more costly.  However, there is the counter offset of maybe it will provide more 
incentive for better investment flows. 
¶51 Now, does it matter for innovation, after you go through all that analysis, and for 
China, which I've suggested is an important case study.  It does matter.  It is as important 
as domestic R&D spending for even a developing country which has grown as well as 
China. 
¶52 So if you think about the importance of technology transfers and why it is we care 
about global rules-based systems, I submit that, yes, a rules-based system may be good 
for investment, very good for liberalizing trade, but one must think hard about the effects 
on technology transfers and the growing global inequality that is witnessed in the system. 
¶53 So I'm going to stop there because I'm at my 20 minutes.  Thank you very much, 
and I look forward to the discussion. 
¶54 (Applause.) 
¶55 MS. YUEH:  We're going to try to make a smooth transition to David, so hopefully 
this will plug in and it will work well. 
¶56 MR. OROZCO:  I will stand for my presentation that way I can project my voice 
outward to everyone and avoid speaking loudly right into Linda's ear. 
¶57 Thank you, Everyone.  It is very pleasant to be here.  I am from this law school, a 
graduate of 2004.  I work at Kellogg now and I do research in intellectual property from 
the competitive advantage and management lens combining what is the legal doctrine 
with the management experience. 
¶58 So we're going to talk about IP, we're going to talk about the BRICs, we're going to 
talk about competitive advantage. 
¶59 What are the BRICs, just to lay a foundation, a framework of what the whole 
discussion is about.  The BRICs are an acronym meaning Brazil, Russia, India and China.  
The origins of this term were a Goldman Sachs report a few years back.  The investment 
banker's research arm, unit, there said if we look at the growth rates of these economies 
and what they're doing, in about 20 years they're going to be tremendously important in 
the global marketplace.  Not that they aren't now, but they're going to replace what are 
our Germany, France, the typical G6 economies in size and importance. 
¶60 That really created a stir amongst people who really study this issue, and really it is 
based on the high GDP growth rates of these economies.  We have to look at what 
they've been doing in the past to understand where they're going to be going in the future. 
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¶61 And why does this all even matter? Well, it matters because our businesses 
compete, and increasingly they compete in a global marketplace. So we now have this 
entire discussion of how do we compete with these economies and these companies that 
are really driving what are the engine of wealth creation for the future and competitive 
advantage in the future. 
¶62 And the press has picked up on this and there is this whole discussion now of the 
new multinationals coming out of these BRIC economies, very competitive, and how our 
industries and our companies and our economy is going to manage this in a competitive 
dynamic where capital is moving, FDI flows are moving back and forth.  And really the 
mobility of labor is also really becoming increasingly international in scope as well, as 
we see in the case of India. 
¶63 So there is this whole discussion. Companies really do have to pay attention to this 
because it is a reality.  We're no longer facing issues of companies competing on cost, 
we're now facing very sophisticated competitors.  Just recently China announced that it is 
going to initiate its large aircraft program.  Who is going to take note of this?  The 
Boeings of the world, the Airbuses of the world, very sophisticated companies, large 
companies that provide extremely sophisticated components, high value added products.  
This is no longer just outsourcing, this is no longer let's just get cost advantage anymore.  
These are big companies that are looming over the horizon threatening our companies, 
the value creation, jobs and economic growth of our economy. 
¶64 So it is good to focus on whether we can compete or not.  There is a lot of 
discussion about that, people are really focusing on that.  But at the same time we really 
have to understand what is below the surface.  There is a deeper layer of understanding 
behind this story, and what we're going to talk about more in this discussion is what are 
the key elements of this story.  Because as we know there are individuals who can really 
just target what are discussions that focus more on the lowest common denominator, 
which is, you know, we're outsourcing our production, this isn't good for our economy.  
The shareholders of our companies that are outsourcing, on the other hand, are claiming it 
is good for them.  So it's really this nuanced discussion and we really want to look at the 
facts as opposed to the rhetoric. 
¶65 So to look at the facts, we have to outline what are the basic research questions 
behind this issue.  And I pose it that the following research questions are really the 
important ones to ask.  First is what is the source of competitive advantage for each one 
of these economies; how do they differentiate themselves in the global marketplace.  
Second is what challenges do they face, because everything isn't rosy in those economies.  
They're growing at very fast rates; however, they're facing extremely important 
challenges for the future growth rates of those economies.  Third is what government 
policies are they implementing to leverage their strengths and overcome those challenges.  
Because what we'll see is that one of the common denominators is that governments in 
these economies play an active role in managing and guiding the economy, and we're 
going to see a bit more about what they do and how that fits into intellectual property 
because that's a key component of competitive advantage and economic development. 
¶66 So first we'll start with brief overviews of each economy.  I'll focus a bit on each.  
We'll start with Brazil, which is the first BRIC economy.  What are the advantages, 
competitive advantages of Brazil?  Well, Brazil has these tremendous natural resource 
endowments.  They have factors of raw materials, they have metals, minerals, a 
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tremendous oil and gas industry.  So these are very, very basic raw materials that they 
have the natural endowments to compete with.  They have an excellent transportation 
infrastructure, and they attract a lot of foreign direct investment, actually, with 
transportation.  They have a very large and very well-developed financial sector.  In fact, 
Sao Paulo is probably the Latin American capital of finance.  It is a huge industry.  And 
they also are starting to develop what is the ICT industry, the communications technology 
industry, software and things of that nature. 
¶67 However, they have really important challenges.  Some of those challenges are that 
they have high fiscal deficits.  The government of Brazil is very active in managing the 
economy, and to do that they borrow a lot.  So they have high fiscal deficits.  The 
diversification of the Brazilian economy is not really as good as it should be.  They focus 
a lot on what are those natural endowments without diversifying as much as they should.  
They have low value-added exports.  They're importing raw materials a lot, which really 
have the lower margins and are susceptible to global pricing, so they basically have to 
take what is the price of the international markets and that's not the most optimal 
scenario.  Right now it is good because those resources are actually very well priced, but 
in the future that could all change.  R&D, they don't focus too much on R&D relative to 
the other BRICs, and that could be a challenge in the future as well. 
¶68 For government policies the Brazilian economy is really highly managed by the 
Brazilian public sector and there is an anti-IP bias of sorts in the Brazilian discussions of 
where to go and move in the future.  Where you see Russia, China and India perhaps 
moving a bit more towards IP embracement, Brazil is really hostile in discussions of 
intellectual property and that might deter growth in the future. 
¶69 Russia is a very interesting case. They're growing very rapidly, but they went 
through a crisis.  They had this period after the communist regime of wild west capitalism 
where the model was let's basically privatize everything, sell it to the public, managers 
can take ownership interest.  And the theory under classical economics is if you have 
property rights the economy will move towards efficient utilization of those resources.  
However, what we saw was the opposite happened.  There was corruption, there was 
mismanagement of resources, there was looting, and basically the economy just went 
down the tubes.  And there was this group known as the oligarchs who controlled the 
resources of production, they controlled everything, and that was not a good scenario for 
Russia under that case. 
¶70 What are the competitive advantages right now of Russia?  Well, Russia again has 
high R&D, they have excellent scientific capabilities. The government is actively 
involved in that.  They have a government guidance program now where as opposed to 
the wild west capitalism many of the key strategic industries now have been pre-
purchased by the government, are being managed now so that they can actually produce 
under a more efficient model, and the economy is being guided in certain key strategic 
sectors.  They have also a high capacity for natural resources as well, gas, metals, mining, 
of that nature. 
¶71 What are the challenges?  Like Brazil, very similarly, they focus a lot on the natural 
resources.  They have a lack of legal infrastructure, which can be a big problem because, 
as we'll see, the rule of law, strong property rights are a key element for moving forward 
in that development cycle towards resource, cost-based advantages to value added 
product differentiation, higher margins industries. 
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¶72 Russia has high involvement of the government in the economy as well.  That 
could be a challenge. 
¶73 Some of the policies are that the state is heavily investing in R&D and they have 
this management structure now where the key strategic industries are controlled by the 
government, the oligarch's power has been reduced, and now the state is taking an active 
role in managing the economy as opposed to pure wild capitalism. 
¶74 India.  This is the story, really, of two different Indias.  There is one India which is 
the middle class and the upper class, which is developing rapidly.  And then two-thirds of 
India, which is really still the agriculture, people in the farms, very low education and 
perhaps savings rates, things of that nature.  So they're really overcoming this difficult 
gap in income right now. 
¶75 Some of their advantages are they have found that by focusing on the service 
sectors they have been able to differentiate themselves from China and other economies 
as well.  So if you look at really the value and the investments that are occurring right 
now in India, they're focusing on the service industries as opposed to manufacturing, 
which would be China's core competitive advantage. 
¶76 English is a source of advantage for China as well.  American companies can now 
focus on servicing in India because of that, of that trait. The engineering skills of India 
are magnificent. They produce so many engineers, highly qualified technicians every 
year.  That's a source of competitive advantage for India as well, especially in the 
software industry.  And that is good for them because it requires very little capital to start 
up software-based investments. 
¶77 And, of course, they're also a friend and ally of the U.S.  They have the same, 
perhaps, mentality of promoting democracy and individualism, and the U.S. sees India as 
a key strategic ally in that respect. 
¶78 They have a lot of challenges.  One of the challenges that India is undergoing right 
now is infrastructure.  They lag behind China and other countries in terms of basic roads, 
land, air transportation.  The logistics of getting things done in India is extremely 
challenging, not just because of the real infrastructure problems but there is also a 
bureaucracy that historically has developed in India that is very strong and provides a big 
barrier to what is the efficient utilization and efficient transfer of resources. 
¶79 They also have less foreign direct investment than China, and the brain issue is also 
a problem for India as well.  Well, you know, they train these highly skilled workers but 
then the workers go to America and other countries where they can monetize their 
intellectual capital. 
¶80 Foreign ownership laws have changed things so things are improving in India.  Big 
state sponsored R&D remains a huge element of the Indian economy, and that could be 
either a source of competitive advantage or a hindrance depending on how you look at it.  
At the stage of development right now that India is you can see that they have to manage 
their economy in some way and the state has to be involved in educating the citizenry, 
promoting what is basic research, and that will eventually, hopefully, get monetized some 
way as property. 
¶81 Software markets have been deregulated as well, which is a positive element of 
India's competitive advantage. 
¶82 Finally we have China.  So we have China now, which, you know, is a major 
player now in the global market.  They have infrastructure advantages. They have R&D.  
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They have an increasing -- I'm sorry, a decreased stake in state-owned enterprises. Now 
the state is becoming less of an actual player in the economy and more of an architect of 
policy, so they're actually combining what are state resources with private resources, so 
they're in a transition period now.  Whereas before the state used to control economic 
production, now it is the state and private sectors combining together.  And hopefully in 
the future, if things go well for them, the government will have a smaller interest in these 
ventures as well. 
¶83 Manufacturing capabilities.  We all know about the story of mainland China and 
how they've really leveraged what are the skills of the workforce, the low cost labor 
advantage.  And, you know, companies, global companies have really taken advantage of 
that and basically moved manufacturing to China. 
¶84 Some of the challenges are related to their transition, like the other economies. 
Basically what's happening now is wages are going up in China.  They are losing that 
cost basis differentiation.  They're trying to manage it so that eventually they enter this 
higher value added production and exploit those benefits as well, because they have a 
highly trained labor force and they want to use that so that these people become 
innovators, these people become managers, they create the new ventures that will 
threaten what are the existing incumbents in the global marketplace, the corporations in 
the developed world. 
¶85 The brain drain I think in China is still there, but I don't know what the indicators 
are.  I think there might be a reversal of that. There is some type of anecdotal evidence of 
that where now people who are highly skilled and left China are coming back to China.  
That's a good signal and I think it is a good sign for China in the future because they need 
the talented managers, they need the talented scientists, inventors, attorneys to come back 
to China and manage those local industries which will compete in the future. 
¶86 One of the challenges is this idea of "Guanxi," which is the idea that relationships 
are a driving force in the economy.  We'll see later how really to move from what is the 
initial stage of government-managed economy to market-based economy you really need 
an impartial rule of law, and this idea of relationships might be a barrier to that. Initially 
they're managing it so that it is a source of competitive advantage for the Chinese 
economy, but in the future as Chinese companies compete amongst themselves and 
against international players there will have to be an increase in the impartial, stable rule 
of law that determines disputes as opposed to relationships. 
¶87 China has done an amazing job managing their economy if you look at any statistic.  
They have guided investments to strategic sectors. They've created these special 
economic zones, as Linda mentioned and these zones have worked amazingly well.  They 
started out with few of these zones to really just study what is -- how economic growth 
would be managed if it worked, and it did work.  So now there are many special 
economic zones throughout China.  They're thriving, the infrastructure behind them is 
excellent, and the investment pours in.  You see China really managing what is 
investment through these special economic zones and through tax policies which 
encourage foreigners to come in, spend the money, do whatever it is that they have to do, 
which typically is exporting the goods back to the originating country. 
¶88 Now, the million dollar question is will the BRICs sustain growth and achieve 
global dominance.  That was the whole goal of the initial research project at Goldman 
Sachs, and we have to find out. 
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¶89 Now, the interesting thing about the Goldman Sachs report was it had these 
assumptions. Like most economic models, they assume things. These assumptions are 
critical to understanding the question and the answer to this question in the future.  Some 
of these assumptions are basic economic issues, social issues, education, human capital, 
infrastructure issues, which we see for the most part that the BRICs are doing a pretty 
good job of managing. 
¶90 India is having some issues with infrastructure but they're spending a lot of money 
to improve.  Human capital in these countries is really growing as well and they're trying 
to make it more equal.  But really I think the key is going to be the rule of law, I think.  
That is where we can really bring a lot to the discussion because what's going to happen 
is these properties are going to have to be managed in some way to create value. 
¶91 And if you look at patents as a proxy of that, what we'll see is that the discussion is 
the WIPO, which manages the PCT, the international patent application system, tells us 
that for 2006 there was record year filings for these economies. However, if you look at 
the data, none of the BRICs really have a significant amount of patents that are valuable 
in the global market.  That tells you a lot.  That tells you that really the patents are not a 
focus of priority and that there is a big assumption that isn't being spoken about.  That 
assumption is that really the value added where the products are created, which are in 5, 
4, and 3 levels of this pyramid, are being ignored by the BRICs at this point.  They're in a 
transition period and most of the investment has focused on levels 1 and 2, which are 
labor arbitrage and process optimization, which are low patenting fields. 
¶92 So to move forward to achieve that growth rate that the BRICs need to achieve so 
that the Goldman Sachs report fulfills itself, they'll have to move up to 3, 4 and 5, and 
patents will be an increasingly important role to protect themselves and to leverage value 
in those spaces of innovation. 
¶93 Now, some of the conclusions that we would draw from this are that each country 
has its own unique industrial strategy.  The twin goals are to sustain growth and move up 
the value chain, to move away from resource cost advantages to innovation 
differentiation marketing.  And the transition is that and will require institutions. It is not 
like the Russian case where you just privatize and let everybody run loose.  That's not 
going to work.  What you need to do is you need to have this rule of law that supports 
investments, encourages investments, encourages value dissemination across the 
economy, knowledge transfers. 
¶94 And finally we see that patents are not yet a part of that discussion.  Because these 
economies are managing their investments, to move forward they have yet to focus on 
patents, because I think ultimately what is going on is these economies are more 
interested in learning, attracting investments, and diffusing the technology and 
establishing what are relationships with future competitors in the future. 
¶95 Thank you very much. 
¶96 (Applause.) 
¶97 MR. GUPTA:  Thank you for the invitation. 
¶98 And, actually, after 16 years I'm in a law school.  My last experience in a law 
school in the U.S. was at the University of Pennsylvania. When I came here for doing my 
Ph.D. at the Wharton School I was interested in counter-trade, technological exchange, so 
I decided to take a course in business law in the law school.  And then midway I decided 
to kind of quit the course because I found the classroom culture in the law school to be 
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very different from the classroom culture in the business school in the sense that in the 
law school there was one-way interaction and I was used to more a two-way interaction 
where like in my MBA program in India part of the grade used to be a class participation 
grade, so I decided to quit that.  And I was told that probably I made a mistake because 
that was not -- I was just told this today, that that's not typical of the law schools, and we 
have built in significant discussion time even today.  So it is never too late to be in the 
law school. 
¶99 Well, today my goal is to share with you an analysis of the technological drivers of 
Indian economy, and the analysis presents a culturally sensitive story of how public, the 
government, and foreign multinational controls complemented and built upon, and not 
substituted or dominated, the indigenous private sector for generating and leveraging 
regional clusters and gendered technological base in India. 
¶100 My perspective is guided by my disciplinary roots in management, focused on 
strategy and international business; my research on culture, particularly as a principal of 
the GLOBE program on culture and leadership in 62 societies; and my continuing and 
evolving research on technological growth, family businesses, and women in leadership, 
based on my dissertation and affiliation with the Family-Owned Business Institute at 
Grand Valley State University and with the women-focused education at Simmons 
College. 
¶101 I'm going to invoke the global innovation systems theory and its limitation as a way 
to situate, motivate and interpret the implications of the analysis that I'm going to present.  
This theory gives a primacy to the role of public controls and multinational controls as 
technological drivers in any emerging economy.  I then discuss the story of India in four 
phases. 
¶102 The first phase covers the period until the formation of the constitutional republic 
in India in 1950 when the technological base was situated primarily amongst the family 
businesses, particularly the craftsmen families in India.  The second phase covers the first 
three decades thereafter when the government sought to play a commanding role in the 
economy.  The third phase covers 1981 to 1995 when the policy environment was 
liberalized to engage professional private firms, particularly in the informatics sector.  
The final phase covers 1996 to 2005 when multinational firms played an increasingly 
prominent role in India. Thereafter, the role of democratic controls in the evolving story 
of India is considered.  Finally, I will briefly look at the cultural dimensions of 
technological drivers in the BRIC countries more broadly. 
¶103 So let's consider the standard prescription on the technological drivers of an 
emerging economy.  The recipe for success, it seems, involves import foreign technology, 
reengineer and adapt it, and incrementally change and apply it. The government plays the 
role of an orchestra manager by funding public sector and subsidizing private sector 
efforts to do so, particularly through concession interest rates.  A successful public 
control also includes manipulating multinational corporations to transfer their latest 
technologies and to engage in FDI to help create local capability to absorb it, again 
through various incentives, tax holidays, land grants and privileged access to domestic 
market. 
¶104 Particularly in Japan and South Korea the government encouraged the keiretsu 
groups and chaebols to import electronics technology from various multinational 
corporations, that incrementally assimilate it, and develop capacity to perform complex 
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innovations.  In both nations the governments restricted foreign investment and focused 
on inducing technology transfer collaborations. 
¶105 However, the same policy appears not to have worked in either of the nations 
during the 1990s when the governments of both nations sought foreign direct investment 
very actively to help restructure the faltering economies and to help revive technological 
growth. 
¶106 China, on the other hand, relied heavily on the public controls to encourage foreign 
direct investment since the early years of economic reforms during the 1980s and later, as 
Linda showed, in the 1990s in particular.  The technology transferred through FDI in 
China, however, in various counts it seems that was generally older generation and 
subject to close international scrutiny under dual-use technology transfer. 
¶107 We can identify at least three major hypotheses suggesting limitations of the global 
innovation model, the global innovation systems model.  First, the socio-technical 
systems hypothesis predicts that technologies are linked to the social institutions and 
attempts to absorb technologies bred in alien social environments create social chaos and 
rejection. 
¶108 Research has demonstrated difficulties in transferring mass production technology 
from the U.S. to Europe, and lean production technology from Japan to the U.S. and 
Europe.  The process involved more than just assimilation of foreign technology. It 
required a complete reengineering and an entirely new solution, such as mass 
customization in the U.S. that built more on mass production rather than on lean 
production in Japan. 
¶109 Secondly, absorptive capacity hypothesis predicts that without a vibrant private 
sector with strong and related broad technological base it may not be even feasible for the 
private sector to absorb and assimilate foreign technology.  And if the government 
coerces this through subsidies, then the absorption initiatives would occur but at a very 
high cost, as we see in Japan also. 
¶110 In South Korea where the government has taken a more iron-clad role by 
supporting large and diversified chaebols the per capita incomes and economic resilience 
has been lower than in Taiwan where the smaller firms have been the drivers of 
innovations. 
¶111 Third, property rights hypothesis predicts that multinational corporations have 
constrained incentives to nurture foreign capacity building because their property rights 
in foreign nations, particularly those who are keen to learn from their know-how and 
develop local base, are incomplete.  MNCs have very -- have been very concerned about 
intellectual property rights piracy in the emerging markets and often withhold transfer of 
their key technologies. 
¶112 So what might be a qualitative model for the emerging markets?  Let's look at the 
story of India and the role different technological drivers have played over the course of 
the history. 
¶113 In Phase 1, until 1950, the technological drivers of India's economy were primarily 
subject to family business controls. Archeological studies suggest that around 2000 BC 
Indian craft families used copper and bronze casting to make fine vessels, tools and 
weapons.  They also brought raw cotton from the villages and spun, wove and dyed that 
in the cities.  Indian craft families focused on occupational subgroups and transferred 
knowledge across generations through family-based learning.  The products were 
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exported from Mesopotamia to Bahrain until 1800 BC when adoption of copper and 
bronze technology in Mesopotamia substituted Indian trade. 
¶114 Later in the first millennium AD Buddhist families in India diffused associated 
know-how, such as temple art and national governance system, to Southeast Asian 
nations.  Then, in the second millennium AD, crafts families fused Islam associated 
technologies, such as architecture, designs, music and cuisine, with their own know-how 
of India.  More recently, over 1850 to 1950, British transferred railroad, telecom and 
postal technologies to colonial India and used them to divert raw materials away from the 
family businesses and flood markets with competing goods. 
¶115 So what are the implications?  Phase 1 suggests that family business controls may 
be effective for the application, inter-generational, and international transfer of 
technology, as we saw with Mesopotamia.  They may also be effective for the 
assimilation of international technology in local cultural endowments, as family 
businesses are strong repositories of local cultural endowments, as we saw with 
transferred knowledge.  However, they may be vulnerable to subordination by hostile 
institutions because of their close identity with their local communities, as we saw with 
the British. 
¶116 In Phase 2, between 1951 and 1980, India as a constitutional republic aimed to 
develop public institutions for driving technological growth.  The Nehru government 
adopted a scientific resolution with a policy framework setting a path of cooperation with 
both Eastern and Western blocs through non-alignment movement.  A blueprint was laid 
for creating universities, policy institutions and publicly funded R&D labs.  The role of 
promoting basic science and basic industries for improving an average citizen's 
conditions of living was recognized. 
¶117 The first five-year plan emphasized reconstruction of British era railroad, telecom 
and postal infrastructure and extended to the rural area with an additional emphasis on 
irrigation.  The second plan put massive public sector funds in the basic and heavy sector.  
The private sector investment was put under licensing controls and were supported 
through concession finance.  Several domains were reserved for the small sector.  In the 
third plan efforts were made to mobilize foreign aid and technology for basic industries, 
agriculture and technical education. 
¶118 So let's look at some of the dynamics here.  Initially the West refused to transfer 
technology for basic industries starting with steel. The Soviet bloc chipped in in that 
dynamic by helping construct a steel plant in India in 1955 and licensed aircraft, tank and 
other military technologies to India, and then expanded assistance in oil, machinery, 
power generation equipment and tractor industries.  The Western bloc, of course 
concerned, countered with its own technology and financing for capital goods to India. 
¶119 However, the U.S. support for China and Pakistan in 1970 alienated India and 
encouraged her to focus on developing her own basic and military technology.  A 
network of 40 R&D labs were created, along with technology and engineering colleges. 
These efforts yielded mixed results.  The nation became 90 percent self-sufficient in 
capital goods by late '70s but there were substantial consumer goods supply constraints, 
along with economic stagnation, inflation, educated unemployment, and growing 
poverty, despite the garibi hatao, the poverty eradication campaign of Indira Gandhi. 
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¶120 Also, the cost of capital goods was very high in India.  For instance, the computers 
that were developed in India had limited applications and were costlier than the better 
foreign options. 
¶121 Also, at the grass roots level the activists sought swadeshi, or indigenous farm 
technology.  India developed new varieties of crops, going beyond the U.S. technology 
transfer that led the initial green revolution in Punjab, using the U.S. model for extension 
networks for universities and heavy state support for farm R&D.  India became self-
sufficient in food by late 1970s and resilient to droughts, compared to mid 1960s when 
famines and food shortages had killed several thousands. 
¶122 So what are the implications here? Phase 2 suggests that the public sector controls 
are often oriented toward basic infrastructure and capital goods industries.  They may 
take an expedient approach to fulfill social goals, such as for regional or national 
development and may end up having disproportionate benefits for the creamy layer, like 
technical growth for instance, with survival public welfare for the bottom of the pyramid 
with increasing poverty deficit in India. They are vulnerable to geo-political issues.  They 
also have high emotional visibility and may be able to engage grassroots activism and 
local cultural endowments for achieving success, as happened in green revolution 
extensions in India. 
¶123 So let's look at Phase 3.  Between 1981 and 1995 the Rajiv Gandhi and later the 
Narasimha Rao governments introduced liberal policies for electronics, including 
computers, telecom and software, focused on the involvement of professionals in the 
development process. Technology trade was liberalized to allow the import of key 
components and technology, particularly for professional body shopping and software 
exports. Government decided to computerize public sector railroads and banks and 
assigned the work to private professionals to help enhance their capabilities, resources 
and confidence.  The government also engaged non-resident Indians, so foreign-based 
Indians, professionals, to help develop an acclimatized telecom switch using various 
component technologies licensed from overseas, and then involved the private sector to 
expand telecom equipment capacity in India.  It took the help of UNDP to connect 750 
academic and research institutions through internet networks. 
¶124 A focus was put on Bangalore as the IT regional cluster.  Bangalore had several 
large public sector electronic, telecom and aeronautic firms, several government R&D 
labs, and several technical colleges.  The region's families had begun sending their 
families to the U.S. for higher studies and were encouraging the daughters to join the 
workforce.  The government selected select MNCs,1 especially from the U.S., to establish 
software development links with professionally run firms in India.  A direct satellite link 
was established between the USA and Bangalore for Texas Instruments, which 
encouraged firms such as Wipro to move from Mumbai to Bangalore.  A body shopping 
link was facilitated between General Electric and Infosys. This had a positive 
demonstration effect on many U.S. multinational corporations who set up software 
development centers in Bangalore. 
¶125 At the same time the smaller firms began importing and assembling Korean and 
Taiwanese computer kits.  The larger firm, diversifying from other sectors such as 
electronic calculators or looking at the emerging opportunity, could not compete with 
 
1 The term “MNC” refers to a  “multi-national corporation.” 
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these smaller firms at cost.  So, many began competing on designs using local 
engineering pool.  Others moved to software by hiring away from the firms who had 
participated in the public sector computerization process and began focusing on the MNC 
clients.  Due to the poor telecom infrastructure, the productivity of offshore work within 
India was about half of the onsite work at the client site in the U.S.  The firms began 
doing low-end work onsite in U.S., but as their alliances strengthened they shifted higher 
end work to India, very interesting, under close mentorship and supervision of the U.S. 
companies.  In particular, the offshore work focused on maintenance of various legacy 
systems by leveraging on the skills of India in working with various foreign platforms, 
like UNIX and other kinds of things.  As of 1995 two-thirds of India's software exports 
were onsite work in U.S., and the rest was offshore work within India.  The onsite work 
was largely body shopping and low-skill programming and short-term client relations.  
The offsite work in India was high value added, focused on systems analysis and design 
skills, and based on long-term client relationships. 
¶126 Phase 2 suggests that the rise of professional controls may need some nascent 
incubation and support in developing capabilities, resources and confidence.  The public 
sector may be able to energize a regional diamond.  The professional controls can also be 
very effective in making a business case to multinationals to invest in higher value-added 
area in the emerging markets. 
¶127 Okay.  So let's look at the -- actually, Phase 4.  Okay, Phase 4.  In between 1996 
and 2005 the government liberalized trade and investment. Many MNCs sought to 
compete with the local family businesses and professional firms using older technology 
and pushed through consumer credit. Japanese firms such as Sony that sought to use 
older technology quickly failed in India.  Many American firms such as GE that sought to 
hire employees at higher compensation rates found it difficult to get and retain sufficient 
numbers of employees to achieve their business goals and decided to divest their BPO 
operations to Indian firms.  Korean firms who adapted Indian methods and offered their 
latest technology products were, on the other hand, hugely successful.  Indian firms also 
became successful multinational corporations using their local culture endowments.  For 
example, Mahindra & Mahindra they developed a hobby farmer market using a focus on 
low-end tractors with smaller farms in India. 
¶128 Now many MNCs, such as Walmart, are recognizing the benefits of collaborating 
with Indian firms to penetrate the rural market. Moreover, MNCs have instituted diversity 
heads and policies in India with aggressive goals.  MNC clients have induced greater 
women in top management in India; the percentage increase from 1 percent to 15 percent 
in the last three years.  All of this has been supported with a government decision to 
reserve one-third posts in the village panchayat, the smallest democratic unit in India. 
¶129 So, to prepare the nation to compete with the multinational corporations they 
decided to withdraw the public sector from non-core areas, supported hundreds of R&D 
projects, and the IT increased from 1.7 percent of GDP to 3.7 percent in 2000. 
¶130 The private sector in India is showing capacity to produce quality goods and 
services at ridiculously low prices:  $20 air fares, two-cents-a-minute cell phone services.  
Hepatitis B, after its introduction in late '80s, was priced by U.S. drug companies at $50 
per day of dose. Shantha Biotechnics, an upstart by a computer scientist with no pharma 
background, developed the drug on its own with less than $1 million investments and 
sold it for $5 a day. 
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¶131 Phase 4 suggests that substantial heterogeneity in the incentives of multinationals 
for investing in what it takes to successfully transfer their technologies.  It looks like the 
learning of local methods and techniques has been critical for the MNC successful tech 
transfer.  The result is not one-way tech trading from MNC to India but a two-way tech 
exchange.  For instance, India-born and educated Indra Nooyi, chair of PepsiCo and 
identified as the most powerful woman leader in the world right now, authored PepsiCo's 
21st Century transformation by diversifying Pepsi from cola beverages to non-cola 
beverages, and that's consistent with the traditional cultural norm in India that rejects cola 
beverages as unhealthy. 
¶132 Okay.  So, what's the emerging trend? First, there is a growing priority on ensuring 
tech diffusion to the bottom of the pyramid in India. The urban areas that benefited most 
from the government's policies over the late '90s and 2000 had low voter turnout and the 
government had to kind of change from the Vajpayee government to the Manmohan 
government.  So there is a focus on introducing IT to the social sectors such as health and 
education and public services. 
¶133 Second, there is a growing emphasis on ensuring ethical use of traditional 
knowledge and eco development.  India is playing, actually, a very important role, a huge 
role, in extending TRIPS and WTO to community knowledge.  And it is supporting that 
through cooperatives and family based businesses and their links with professional firms 
and MNCs. 
¶134 So these trends imply that public controls in India have shifted their role from 
being the nation's primary financier and generator of knowledge to a secondary supporter 
of innovations by well-managed private sector companies, and now to a tertiary 
governance and organization of distributed knowledge in diverse communities. 
¶135 So let's sum up what we have seen. 
¶136 Though public and MNC controls have been important technological drivers in 
India, local family and professional businesses have played a critical local.  India is thus 
now able to compete globally not only in the low-end domains on cost and simplicity, but 
also in the high-end domains on design and complexity.  The linear model of tech 
upgrading, based purely on assimilation and upgrading of foreign technology, does not 
account for India's design-intensive competence.  There is a need to add the local cultural 
endowment factor to explain India's story. 
¶137 Very quickly.  So this is the research that I have done on the GLOBE project on 
culture in society.  This is the code on society practices based on data from 17,000 middle 
level managers and 1,000 companies on a scale of 1 to 7.  This actually received a Best 
Research Award from SIOP, the Society For Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 
in 2005, actually. 
¶138 So let's use the GLOBE study.  We look here at four of the nine cultural dimensions 
in GLOBE.  Performance orientation is acknowledging and rewarding actual 
contributions and performance. Uncertainty avoidance is ensuring stability and using 
existing technologies as opposed to emphasizing change and developing new 
technologies. Humane orientation is being warm, generous and kind. Gender 
egalitarianism is gender role overlap between men and women, and women 
empowerment. 
¶139 India stands out, as you can see, for its high humane orientation and low gender 
egalitarianism.  India's grassroots concerns and its focus on traditional know-how are 
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reflective of humane orientation.  Moderate uncertainty avoidance may allow India to 
build upon this knowledge while learning from the new foreign technology.  India has 
benefited substantially through interactions with more gender egalitarian societies.  
Moderate performance orientation may allow India to drive technological growth while at 
the same time being culturally sensitive to issues such as family life. 
¶140 Of course, the cultures of other nations support their own approaches to technology 
and we need to investigate that to fully understand those stories. 
¶141 Thank you. 
¶142 (Applause.) 
¶143 MS. YUEH:  Good.  Thank you very much to my fellow panelists for sticking to 
time.  I thought that was tremendous. 
¶144 So we have about 25 minutes, I think, for discussion and Q&A.  The floor is open. 
¶145 Surely there are some plants ready to ask questions. 
¶146 Yes.  You're definitely a plant. 
¶147 MR. GREENFIELD:  I'm curious why Brazil, the government, has taken on an 
anti-IP stance and if you think that is affecting foreign investment.  I feel like there was 
some worry in the U.S. back with India and China a decade ago about investing without 
strong IP regimes. 
¶148 MR. OROZCO:  That's a great question.  I think the IP question is one that takes 
root a lot in an ethical dimension as well, and that is one that is not discussed oftentimes 
as India or the literature. I think Vipin is doing a great job by showing how really 
technology and culture are not really an easy mapping scenario where you can just say if 
you want to develop you have to have this approach to technology, you have to import 
these norms, and the result will be the formula of success. 
¶149 I think really what happens is you're dealing with different strengths in each 
economy.  I think Brazil has this very long tradition of state involvement in the economy, 
as most Latin American countries do in general.  And I think the norm is that the state is a 
paternalistic type of force in the economy, and really the move from paternalism to 
private endowments is one that is challenging right now for all these economies. 
¶150 Brazil I think is one where for cultural reasons they just have this bias against 
private ownership at this stage because it is viewed as an exploitation type of mechanism 
where the foreign companies own knowledge and they manage it for their own wealth but 
the local economy really doesn't benefit very much at this stage.  So I think that is one of 
the issues. 
¶151 But it is also a political issue as well.  I mean, governments manage these 
discussions to promote their own agendas as well, and we see that everywhere, actually. 
¶152 MS. RAGAVAN:  Thank you. 
¶153 Only ten years or so back we talked a lot of these minimum standards for growth 
until China and Russia disproved it, so I always wonder maybe IP is another fetish of the 
West.  After all, all of these countries have become important not by embracing IP first 
but by actually being anti-IP first, and that goes for all BRIC economies.  So I wonder if 
IP is another Western fetish that will pass with time. 
¶154 And I just want to highlight something else.  We talked about BRICs moving.  
David, you talked about BRICs moving to the next level in the pyramid, 3, 4 and 5, and I 
don't see BRICs doing that unless they balance income inequality, trade, you know, 
versus increased foreign direct investments.  So in order to do that they really have to 
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violate TRIPS, they can't do that by conforming to TRIPs.  So I wonder if on some level 
that will come back to IP being yet another Western fetish. 
¶155 MR. OROZCO:  I think you're right.  I think these economies are really 
strategically focused on promoting industries that distribute the wealth I think as widely 
as possible.  Manufacturing is one, service oriented.  Industries that create eco systems of 
complementary innovations, that promote jobs.  So I think that is a high priority. 
¶156 I think intellectual property at this point is kind of like not at the top of the 
economies' agendas per se, they're trying to manage what you just said.  I think that's my 
perspective on this issue.  I think intellectual property management is going to become 
critical and is going to move up to that value position, which they obviously want it, it is 
in their interest to, but at this stage it is going to be one of management of what you just 
said. 
¶157 And the assumptions behind the BRICs paper in Goldman Sachs, and any other 
paper that focuses on global economies, focuses on all these fundamental issues of rule of 
law, of diffusion of income, you know, equality and infrastructure. 
¶158 You're right, it is right to focus on the system, because you cannot just focus on 
intellectual property, that's not the right view. That's oftentimes the view that's presented 
in the media and oftentimes the discussion is IP, IP, IP, but really what we're seeing is 
bigger questions. 
¶159 MR. GUPTA:  I think the issue is cultural perspective in the emerging markets.  IP 
is really community based, so it is community endowment, and all the antecedent 
knowledge of the community.  Even if you look at planning, like when you talk about 
cost-oriented occupation subgroups, that's again the marketing and branding is situated in 
the community. So there is an important challenge when the basic platform of knowledge 
in an emerging market is community based.  How do you kind of differentiate or separate 
out and tease out the affects of the private property from the community property and can 
you give that community property ownership to particular companies. 
¶160 So I think India is playing kind of a very important role in the world, especially in 
the Commonwealth countries, bringing that perspective and educating the WTO around 
those issues. 
¶161 MS. YUEH:  I think -- just sort of a quick comment on the TRIPS.  I think a lot of 
the objection to TRIPS at the time and why it is being delayed is that it is felt that 
developing countries, especially not too much for industrial technology but 
pharmaceuticals, there is a real argument for allowing it to continue to do things like 
licensing. 
¶162 So I think we often hear that developing countries, especially China, disregard 
IPRs, and I do think that there is potentially a conflict in the way that they view 
intellectual property rights.  On the one hand they were very much -- and most of these 
foreign direct investors are geared at getting technologies which can help them grow and 
be more productive cheaply, but on the other hand there is this feeling you have to have a 
better institution or set up to gain better technologies.  I think perhaps this calculus is 
very difficult to weigh and there will come a stage where it will be in the interest of 
developing countries' firms to have protection of their innovations and intellectual 
property, but it feels evolutionary and that is why they're under a lot of critique. 
¶163 I think the big change with TRIPS highlights the distance between what some of 
the developing countries' objectives are and perhaps what is used as a long-term better 
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system of having a good rules-based system where everyone can be assured that the 
investment that they put in will not be misappropriated. 
¶164 MR. OROZCO:  Just to add on to that.  I think also it is important to look at the 
history again and the philosophical foundations of intellectual property.  It really 
originated in what is the Enlightenment, this Western notion of the individual's progress 
through technical means, it is a big, big part of that discussion.  And a lot of these 
cultures really view knowledge in a different way, and their histories reflect that.  So 
they're coming at a crossroads where, I think, they're facing this global competition, 
global challenge that they want to compete in and they are very successful in doing some 
things, but at the same time there is this underlying policy issue of how do we manage 
information within society and of that nature. 
¶165 Now, another interesting thing with intellectual property is that really it's not -- 
intellectual property is not the end, really; it is really value created.  That is kind of the 
research that I focus on more, is how do you use intellectual property to create value as 
opposed just to build a fence around something, and then hope that eventually it leads to 
stuff.  And ultimately, I think, the countries can differentiate themselves to be very 
intelligent with management of intellectual property if that becomes a critical focus of the 
discussion.  It's not how to create a barrier but how to actually disseminate the value 
through innovate ways.  They have an opportunity to really approach intellectual property 
from these perspectives. 
¶166 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  The next natural question is which country out of all 
the countries you mentioned is closest to buying into this IP regime or is coming up to 
speed in that respect? 
¶167 MR. GUPTA:  I think the issue from many of these countries' perspective, again, is 
what's the framework, the policy framework within which intellectual properties are 
being managed, unless there is a recognition of what intellectual property does to the 
economy. 
¶168 I give you a very simple example. Suppose if -- you always talk about technology 
needs to be adapted to a local country.  If you adapt technology to local countries then 
there is an intellectual property competence that the multinationals are using from local 
countries, and we assign that learning as intellectual property of the multinational and we 
do not assign that learning to be intellectual property of the local countries. 
¶169 So there is a fundamental disconnect because really from that angle foreign 
multinationals are never going to be able to make any money in emerging markets 
because by the very management logic you have to adapt, you have to make some 
adaptations.  Then the issue is how do you value the value of those adaptations versus 
value of technology which is already invested and used in the U.S.  One could say that if 
you already are using that technology in the U.S. then it should be valued less than the 
new learning that you're getting.  Or you can say, no, my value is here. 
¶170 So there is this whole issue regarding philosophy of value which needs to get into 
this. There is so much politics, which is always going to play a role, that we'll never come 
to a solution, and really the issue is going to be whether we recognize the mutual 
technological flows which allow kind of the Western economies to grow with the 
technology rather than to see it as diffusion of their technology to overseas countries. 
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¶171 MR. OROZCO:  I think -- you know, honestly I think they're pretty similar stages, 
actually.  It is really interesting to see how they're each using their own strategy but at the 
same time they're carefully managing the process. 
¶172 I think based on numbers, based on absolute numbers just because of the size, I 
think China is probably at a little bit slightly more sophisticated state of IPR, just because 
of the long history of foreign direct investment, actually, and basically their policies and 
their harmonization. But at the same time the enforcement issue is critical, so right now 
everybody is focused on how there is this very bad enforcement in China, how you have 
to have special relationships, the issue of knowing someone who can get things done.  
But if you look at raw numbers of patent filings and things of that nature, in the patent 
world at least China has the largest stake in what is technical knowledge proper. 
¶173 MS. YUEH:  Other questions? 
¶174 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  You mentioned property rights.  At this moment the 
BRICs economies are particularly vulnerable, so my question is to anyone:  What policies 
would those developed countries be able to take not only to protect the property rights of 
companies but also to compete with the companies in BRICs economies where the 
intellectual property rights are not first priority or top rights?  So in order to do so, the 
TRIPS system, is it enough or is there something for developed countries to compete with 
companies in BRICs economies? 
¶175 MR. GUPTA:  Essentially from the research which I have done, again, the 
important issue is that from a multinational perspective what do you count as your IPR, 
and generally it seems like most IP is associated with technical knowledge.  But there is a 
fuller organizational knowledge also, that MNCs own the marketing expertise and 
product optimization techniques and all that.  And what we have seen is that while the 
companies are trying to protect their technical knowledge, they give the rest of the 
knowledge free.  Like subcontracting to India.  All the other knowledge would be given 
free and they will try to protect only the technical knowledge. 
¶176 So one of the important issues is to recognize the value of the other things and to 
start kind of trying to say, okay, what can we do with this?  That's where the IPR regime 
doesn't kind of apply and therefore the companies don't understand it.  I think by focusing 
on that we're getting a better mutual understanding between kind of how to govern 
property rights on which you cannot have assigned intellectual property rights in the 
current sense, because that's the problem of emerging markets, that's the problem of 
organizational knowledge. 
¶177 MR. OROZCO:  I think that is well put.  There are many different types of 
knowledge that you have to protect the capabilities.  You can't rely just essentially on IP.  
You have to rely on other tacit knowledge which isn't exploiting things that really other 
people cannot observe and that are sources of competitive advantage and really protecting 
those rights that probably expand your market share in those markets initially, build up 
brand equity if possible.  Playing by the country's own rules.  If you need relationships in 
China, establish a relationship and try to get your IP enforced in your economy. 
¶178 So, yeah, relying on different forms of IP, tacit knowledge, which is invisible, and 
playing by the rules of the local economies.  Probably a multi-pronged strategy that 
companies can take. 
¶179 MS. YUEH:  It reminds me of when I used to be a lawyer getting asked that by 
clients.  I think my feeling is it is going to keep lawyers employed for quite a long time, 
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because the vehicle for foreign direct investment is extremely important.  So I think some 
of the vehicles have changed with the kind of industrial technology being outsourced to 
these countries. 
¶180 For instance, if you're very worried about R&D know-how, then the R&D 
investment component of one's investment could be a wholly foreign owned enterprise, 
but for other bits of the investment -- so the FDI could go in and apply for a hybrid, only 
for R&D, it could be joint ventures for, say, for instance, distribution or production where 
local knowledge and local connections and supply chains are very important and it is 
difficult to navigate in an imperfect legal system so you need to borrow the relationships 
of the local firms that you're interacting with.  But you would segregate what would be 
considered to be, for instance, knowledge that one would be very loathe to have reverse 
engineered and use a hybrid form to try to manage the particular country. 
¶181 But I think probably the sense from the presentations this morning and more 
generally is that every single market is very different, and so what might work in China 
will likely not work in India.  So like I said, it will keep lawyers busy for quite a long 
time. 
¶182 Other questions? 
¶183 MR. LEV:  My question is sort of related to that and to your answer to that.  The 
subtopic of the panel is public versus private control, and I got the sense from Professor 
Orozco that the BRICs are kind of all in the same place of a hybrid system of public and 
private control of both the economy and the intellectual property technology 
development. 
¶184 So looking at what actually is driving value, and it might be different in each 
economy, but do you see that countries that lack internal competition and put technology 
solely in the hands of state-controlled monopolies are at a long-term disadvantage versus 
the other BRICs that have taken more of an anti-monopolistic, competitive approach to 
technology and development? 
¶185 MR. OROZCO:  I mean, India is a great example to talk about because so much of 
the research and development in India right now is state-sponsored, state-owned.  I think 
it is really about -- you have to look at it, I think, from a temporal aspect; you have to find 
out what eventually is going to come out of that.  In China we saw that a lot of the human 
capital moved into value producing enterprises that eventually are successful and 
probably very evolved, so there has been quite a talk about that as well. 
¶186 MR. GUPTA:  Exactly.  You have to take a temporal perspective in that if that 
remains within the state-owned enterprises then really it doesn't benefit the local 
economy also and it's not going to play a very important role in the international markets, 
especially for the WTO.  Really restricting the ability of the government to fund and 
subsidize public-held R&D initiatives. 
¶187 MS. YUEH:  It does raise an interesting question because most IPR systems try to 
differentiate between what should be publicly funded R&D that provides general social 
benefits.  So, for instance, subsidizing research facilities in universities.  So there is a 
level at which public control is absolutely necessary because we don't want to have 
artificial monopoly pricing of what should be basic technologies.  This is a very standard, 
narrow time model. 
¶188 But what's difficult to differentiate even today is the overlap between basic 
technologies and what would be considered to be value creating industrial marketable 
   487
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
technologies, and those may raise a very difficult question as to how much of it should 
be, say, favorable IPR systems, which don't have to be just laws, subsidies, tax breaks, 
there are a lot of ways of fostering innovation, and how much of that should come from 
private sources. 
¶189 But in general I think you're right in thinking about whether or not state-controlled 
monopolies do matter versus, say, having a greater degree of competition.  And I think 
the theory is mixed on this and the evidence is mixed on this because there is the 
Shamptering (phonetic) versus Arrow view that monopolies are more innovative because 
they have money versus small firms are more innovative because they're hungry.  It is an 
open empirical question. 
¶190 Since you're the editor-in-chief of this issue, you're allowed to ask a second 
question. 
¶191 MR. LEV:  To get a sort of -- how much do you think of what you just -- the issue 
you just addressed of the IPR and TRIPS are differentiated between public and private 
issues can be broken down through adequate technology transfer regimes, what you just 
said, taxes, licensing regimes, but not specifically associated with the IPR, the technology 
focus of IPRs? 
¶192 MS. YUEH:  I think that on the technology transfer issue TRIPS provides a 
framework which is very broad and at an overview level.  Simply that patents are to be 
respected for 20 years, for instance.  Now, that doesn't preclude, say for instance, for a 
developed country's government, say, transferring and giving away green technology, 
agricultural technology.  So it says the IPR is there, but it has always been the case the 
IPR holder can waive the right to receive royalties for its use. 
¶193 Now, the difficulty again with TRIPS is that the carveouts understand that things 
like pharmaceuticals are not the same as industrial technologies which can be geared at 
profit.  Those are, for instance, things like generic drugs for HIV, for basic diseases, and 
those ought to be transferred, ought to be carved from this kind of TRIPS regime.  But it 
is, again, highly controversial and a subject of debate as to how much of the pharma are 
willing to allow generic versions of their drugs to go to emerging countries, which then, 
of course, have the potential of escaping back across borders.  So this is not an easy issue 
at all, even for things like drugs. 
¶194 But I think that for the most part what it -- it doesn't preclude other governments 
from giving away useful, basic technologies, but all the disputes do come on the much 
harder questions, which are what is industrial technology and how do we gain the best 
value for the cost of innovation we've put into it in our country which you're now going 
to enjoy a benefit from.  So that is -- there is no easy calculus on that.  But that's why it is 
interesting to think about and have a conference to talk about. 
¶195 I think I probably have time to take one more final question.  You're allowed to ask 
a second one. 
¶196 MR. WORD:  So I understand there is regulation or law in India that kind of keeps 
outside firms outside of India and doesn't allow particularly U.S. based firms to open up 
shop.  Do you think that has an affect, at least a negative affect on India's ability to buy 
into these intellectual property regimes and file more international patents?  What are 
your thoughts on that? 
¶197 MR. GUPTA:  Well, first of all, in India there have been significant liberalizations 
and multinationals are now allowed to make a significant investment.  Of course, there is 
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also a strong visibility.  Walmart was trying to invest in India and there was a huge 
backlash, and therefore they decided that they were not going to back innovations.  But 
what has happened is attractions with the foreign clients.  Indian companies have become 
hugely sensitive to the significance of creating IPRs.  So many of them, the leading 
companies, they're actually kind of taking a lead in kind of even using their process 
know-how and converting that into product and knowledge which can be sort of used in 
various same processes, applied to different sectors and different clients and different 
products.  So the differentiation between process knowledge and product knowledge is 
big there. 
¶198 So that's an evolution in thinking in India which is evolving only recently.  And so 
definitely multinationals have played an important role in creating very vibrant private 
culture around technological issues. 
¶199 MS. YUEH:  Any final questions? 
¶200 Otherwise, I think we ought to wrap up. And that just leaves me the privilege of 
thanking my fellow panelists, who have been excellent.  Thank you all. 
¶201 (Applause.) 
¶202 MR. LEV:  And we have one gift for the panelists.  And I thought it might be 
interesting to note that the gift that we chose is also incorporating the ideas of the 
conference.  It is a specialty tea that's actually owned by -- developed by a Kellogg alum, 
so a Northwestern connection, but the specialty tea is grown on his family's plantation in 
northern India.  It is a whole leaf tea, it is organic, and it is green technology.  Not only 
that, it won the most innovative product in Illinois last year because of its very innovative 
method of packaging and distributing tea.  So I hope you'll enjoy that. 
¶203 (Applause.) 
¶204 MR. LEV:  Lunch will be in the Atrium.  Just follow the students, they can show 
you the way. 
¶205 (The panel discussion was concluded.) 
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